Shaping a Different Europe
Ernst Hillebrand / Anna Maria Kellner (Eds.)

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It has become a commonplace to state that the European integration project stands at a crossroads. Doubts concerning the process of integration have also infiltrated the political left. The crises besetting the Eurozone have shaken the previous unanimity in favour of ever deeper integration. At best there is a consensus that the present state of affairs – a common currency with continuing national responsibility for banking supervision and fiscal policy – is unstable and that the European Union is more split than unified. Some on the left are now calling for a great leap forward, while others seek an orderly retreat from ill-conceived forms of integration.

Debates on the future of the EU tend to concentrate on the bigger picture and the grand questions of the future of the continent. The integration project does not know social classes nor political parties, but only Europeans. This depoliticisation of European integration is, of course, nothing new. It has accompanied the EU from the outset and concerns all political camps. In the shadow of this formal depoliticisation, however, something different has been happening: European integration was and remains an eminently political process. It is shaped by social and economic interests and ideological premises. As in any political process, here, too, there are winners and losers. And as in any political process the age-old question of politics also applies to European integration: *cui bono* – whom is it good for?

With this book, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung would like to contribute to the re-politicisation of the debate on Europe. We
want to offer some answers to a question that is being posed with increasing urgency: what is the relationship between the realities of European integration on one hand, and the fundamental values and aims of the political left with regard to democracy, self-determination, freedom and prosperity for as many people as possible, on the other? Is the EU, in this context, an emancipatory instrument for the citizens of Europe? Or, on the contrary, is it rather an agent of the creeping disenfranchisement of democratic sovereignty and the hollowing out of the political and welfare-state achievements of the »Social Democratic« twentieth century in Europe?

_Three Dilemmas of the EU_

If one tries to answer these questions one comes up against three fundamental dilemmas, which have gone hand in hand with the very nature of the European integration process in recent years. They all concern the core of the political project of the European left: Democratic self-determination, social security and prosperity for all.

(i) Democracy and citizens’ participation: European integration is widely perceived as an elite project characterised by low popular participation. The sovereignty of nation-states and their parliaments has been dramatically weakened throughout the management of the euro crisis. Citizens’ trust in the possibility of influencing policy at European level, as opinion polls regularly confirm, is much lower than in the framework of the nation-state. Turnout in European elections has fallen continually since their introduction in 1979.

(ii) Welfare state and deregulation: Europe has been characterised by growing inequality in recent decades. The European Court of Justice’s interpretation of European law – for example, in the rulings on _Laval_ and _Rüffert_ – has significantly increased competition between social and labour market systems. The scope
for direct wage competition between workers in Europe has been significantly increased by the single market and the rules on freedom of movement. European deregulation, tax competition and tolerance of tax avoidance of all kinds have weakened the revenue base of nation-states and increased the fiscal burden of average wage earners.

(iii) Growth and prosperity: Historically, the relatively weak input-legitimacy of the European integration process was implicitly compensated by the output-legitimacy of economic integration, which was generally portrayed as successful. The financial and euro crises significantly weakened this dimension of legitimacy, however. The most closely integrated part of the EU – the Eurozone – today has the weakest growth rate in the OECD world. The goal of ensuring prosperity for all appears no longer achievable for many EU member states in the foreseeable future. Especially in the crisis countries in the south many companies are fighting for their lives with no growth in sight. Youth unemployment in the Eurozone is, by any standard, extremely high.

A Progressive Vision for Europe

Given these developments the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung asked left-wing and progressive intellectuals from ten European countries to offer their visions of »another Europe«: a Europe, in other words, that does justice to the interests and needs of the people of the continent and that does not compromise the political and social achievements of European nation-states, but rather strengthens and expands them. In our view, such a debate is not just generally desirable, but politically unavoidable. The implicit consensus on which the integration project was able to rely for decades has become fragile. This presents, in particular, the pro-European left with the challenge of re-establishing its fundamental attitudes and positions.
In this context, what kind of relationship between Europe-wide and national solutions should be sought? Can European integration, despite the lack of a European »demos«, take the form of a state-like construction within the framework of a »federal Europe«? What are the risks and side-effects of a voluntaristic »great leap forward«? There are no unequivocal answers to these questions and none of the contributions offer them. The authors’ views range from a clear commitment to a federal Europe to deep concerns about the political and economic collateral damage of a rush to an »ever closer union«. However, none of the contributions leaves any doubt about one thing: the need for European integration and cooperation. We all want a strong, democratic and prosperous Europe and an EU that enjoys legitimacy and respect among the people of Europe. We all want a Europe that really benefits the working majority and the socially vulnerable of this continent; a Europe that strengthens not weakens democracy and self-determination. The question that concerns us all is that of the best ways of achieving these goals. This debate has only started and will go on for some time. With this book, we hope to make a meaningful contribution to that debate.
Current State of Play: Democracy and Citizen Participation

The lack of citizen participation in the European project is not an aberration of our times, a sign of deplorable ignorance and disinterest, but a longue durée feature of a form of integration that has unfolded with the deliberate aim of keeping citizens out. In integration theory the technical term used to describe this approach is functionalism.

Contrary to the narrative promoted by the official propaganda machinery of the European Union, the integration process was not a linear one. However much certain founding fathers such as Adenauer or Spinelli wanted a federal Europe after the Second World War, the 1940s and 1950s brought no such developments. Numerous attempts at founding a European political system ran out of steam. Other founding fathers, such as Paul-Henri Spaak, wanted a Europe based on free trade, which is what eventually materialised with the seminal European Economic Community of the 1957 Treaty of Rome. European federalists, facing the fact that even after complete devastation and mass genocide Westphalian nation states were still not ready to pool their sovereignty in a meaningful federal state, accepted a fatal concession. Their only remaining hope was that by starting with free trade, experts would guide Europe in a technocratic process without popular legitimation, and a series of spillovers would eventually necessitate a political union. This was the compromise accepted by the likes of Monet and Hallstein, while others like Spinelli became increasingly disillusioned. The very nature of this functionalist project was an antithesis to the construction of a European demos.
Unfortunately for the federalists, the political right was captured by the neoliberal movement in the 1970s. With the entry of Britain, Margaret Thatcher became a defining voice in European affairs, and Mitterand’s famous U-turn eliminated France as a potential countervailing force. With the Single European Act Thatcher achieved the intergovernmental free-trade Europe she had hoped for, the foundation on which everything else could be built, as she famously believed. The towering figure of Jacques Delors emerged as her federalist counterweight, unmatched by any Commission President since, and the continent-wide reunification process ignited by Gorbatchev gave spiritual impetus to another wave of federalist enthusiasm. Delors’ greatest political achievement, the Maastricht Treaty, rekindled the hopes of the federalists with a new official title, the Union, which implied but did not deliver federalism. The Schengen system, the common currency and environmental legislation were spectacular successes, especially seen against global trends. Regionalism and development transfers proved to be a temporary surge which then regressed into a rigid technocratic buy-off of poorer member states. The Common Foreign and Security Policy was a predicament already at its inception, and remained so. The rhetorical commitment to a »European social model« never materialised in the acquis communautaire, and member states – with the exception of the Scandinavians – set about rolling back even their national welfare states.

The doomed push for a European constitution sealed the fate of the functionalist promise to the federalists. The European Union remained a predominantly intergovernmental organisation, where the Council, representing governments, makes the most important decisions. The Commission is dependent on the Council in that it lost its own resources and the Commissioners depend on member states for re-election. Citizens have such indirect influence on the makeup of the Commission that it amounts to next to nothing. The other supposed counterweight, the European Parliament, the world’s only elected supranational institution, has
continued to gain powers representing Community interests, but it is still essentially subordinate to the Council. Within the Union’s Byzantine decision-making structure, the Parliament possesses its strongest powers in the co-decision procedure, where it can veto the decisions of the Council. Unfortunately the reverse is also true, which means that there is not a single decision-making instance where Community interests could overrule the particular interests of the member states. As a consequence, the Parliament cannot play a ground-breaking role in the integration process. Although European citizens are not familiar with this institutional jungle, nor should they realistically be expected to be, they have enough experience to know that national rather than European elections are decisive for the issues they really care about. As a consequence they abstain from voting in European elections, or use them to punish incumbent national governments.

The Council, which we can thus identify as the platform where long-term decisions are made in an essentially intergovernmental Union, reproduces the deep divisions of the member states. The Lisbon Treaty essentially guarantees veto rights on fundamentally important issues such as taxation. In other areas a majority could theoretically prevail, but in reality it is hard to imagine a majority group overruling a member state that has strong opposing interests on a specific issue. Support for the European Union is already at such a low point in most member states that contradicting the perceived vital interests of a member state would push anti-European sentiments to boiling point. In the world of package deals and horse trading, governments therefore broker deals to uphold the status quo. As a consequence, arguably no treaty of historical importance has been signed since Maastricht in 1992. European integration has stalled.

European citizens were for decades explicitly and deliberately excluded from major decisions related to European integration. When referendums were eventually held, they mostly rejected the initiatives as a sign of protest that the European Union does not
address the issues they really care about. Eurobarometer regularly polls Europeans about such issues. Jobs, immigration, corruption, climate change and similar issues usually top the list. But citizens also opine that the Union is largely unable to answer these challenges. Member states have not transferred adequate powers to the Community level to enable it to act to meet these challenges.

Welfare State and Deregulation

The welfare state was a European civilizational achievement. It was highly successful not only in terms of social cohesion and mobility, but also in terms of employment and economic growth, especially compared to the decades of neoliberalism that followed it. It was also a guarantee of democracy in that it secured a materially independent and well-educated block of voters who were well positioned to defend and maintain democratic institutions and values. Unfortunately, the economic shocks of the 1970s (two oil shocks, Nixon shock, Volcker shock) disrupted the European economies. The propaganda machinery of the neoliberal movement, generously financed by corporations that were increasingly transnational in scope and size, was well prepared to exploit these weaknesses. It convinced the middle classes who had grown affluent under the welfare state that they no longer needed to show solidarity towards the poor, and that this would allow them to increase their prosperity faster.

The neoliberal movement initially conquered the conservative parties in the 1970s, before making increasing headway into left-wing parties from the 1980s onwards (Mitterrand, Blair, Schröder). The ideological underpinnings were provided by Anthony Giddens’ The Third Way. Social democratic parties moved to the centre to occupy the cultural left/economic right territory of the European liberal parties, which suffered severe electoral losses as a result.

In spite of the rhetoric about a »Social Europe«, welfare states remained almost exclusively national regimes. The Anglo-Saxon
economies moved radically towards a neoliberal model, the Mediterraneans had never developed full welfare states, and a large number of small member-states from the former Eastern Bloc entered as neophyte converts to the Anglo-Saxon faith. Even Germany radically reduced the share of output taken by wages, creating a low-wage underclass and an overpaid CEO class. The overwhelming trend in the intergovernmental Union was member states moving away from the welfare state model, with only Scandinavia preserving it and even adding a sustainability dimension. Significantly but not surprisingly, this was the only region of the European Union left standing after the Great Recession reached Europe in 2008. (Germany is generally held to be another winner, and has certainly strengthened its standing significantly, but this was based on a »beggar thy neighbours and thy lower classes« approach, competing by lowering wages, which had dramatic consequences elsewhere in the Eurozone.)

The free movement of capital, one of the basic tenets of the actually existing integration process, has allowed jobs to flow abroad. The Eastern enlargement further strengthened this process by boosting rather than harmonising competition between social and labour market systems. This had a negative effect in the east, where as much as half the population lives close to or below a subsistence minimum, with only rudimentary welfare provisions and very poor job security. It has also had a negative effect in the north and west, where eastern competition has been instrumentalised to push for an erosion of the welfare state. The principle of free movement of services and labour also contributed to undermine important national labour market provisions. Important landmark rulings by the European Court of Justice, such as the Laval and Rüffert cases, have dealt enormous blows that are not adequately recognised across Europe.

Simultaneously with these processes, several member states (primarily the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta, but also to a certain extent Ireland, Austria and Latvia) and partner
states (Switzerland) turned themselves into quasi tax havens, as demonstrated by the International Tax Justice Network, an NGO that did the homework of the international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), EU or the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Offshore finance has grown from a peripheral phenomenon into a massive global system that drains resources from national budgets and welfare systems. In a significant number of EU member states the pension system, for instance, would return to sustainability if resources were not being diverted offshore. However, the above-mentioned member-states have blocked the resolution of this international issue.

It must be added that the widely accepted demographic arguments about welfare state unsustainability rest on shaky ground. With youth unemployment critically high in all but a handful of states, and dramatically high in Spain, Italy, Croatia, Greece and elsewhere, the argument that there are not enough babies being born is ridiculous. The reality is that private sector jobs have gone to low wage countries outside of Europe, and the public sector is unable to respond to the changing nature of social demand (such as moving away from technologically obsolete jobs towards social services, care for the elderly, healthcare, etc.) by creating public sector jobs because it is underfinanced due to offshoring of profit and wealth, as well as tax-rate competition in a race to the bottom.

**Economy and Europeanisation**

As outlined above, the input legitimacy of the European integration process was weak because it was functionalist in nature. This was supposed to be redressed by economic output legitimacy, although the results here hang in the balance. Overall growth in the European Union slowed considerably after the completion of the single internal market, as the free movement of capital enabled tax revenue and job flight, while the wage share of GDP
dropped compared to the welfare state era. Social inequalities increased. Norway and Iceland rejected EU membership partly to preserve their welfare states, while a Swedish referendum resulted in accession during the only window in the country’s history when the pro-EU vote was in the majority. Greece, southern Italy and Portugal all deindustrialised as a result of accession. Ireland avoided this by becoming the Trojan horse of US capital, Cyprus by turning itself into a tax haven. Spain is arguably the only Mediterranean country that has unreservedly benefited from EU accession.

In reality the political left in Europe had always supported the integration project as a form of self-fulfilling promise of internationalism that could gradually wear away nationalism. They did not foresee Westphalian atomisation being replaced by a Union immediately after the Second World War, but to them a functionally interconnected Europe with a hollow federalist symbolism was still preferable to a Europe of autarchy and potential conflict. Most on the left even believed that Europe can thank the integration process for replacing armed nationalist territorial rivalries with peace, trade and foreign investment. They never contemplated the possibility that the process went the other way around: war came to be considered unnecessary and went out of fashion. Any territorial gains had proved to be transitory and were almost always overturned. War was replaced by foreign direct and portfolio investment, which also enabled capital to control assets in abroad without having to brutalise the local population, who came to be seen as consumers. This sea change made the actually existing economically liberal form of European integration possible.

The common currency was partly a political project. It was well-known long before Maastricht that economies with unsynchronised growth rates cannot have the same interest rates. The European Monetary Union, as an unoptimised currency area, eventually led to asset price bubbles and collapse in the south. The problem, however, is even more complicated. The Lisbon
strategy, which aimed but failed to make Europe more competitive, ran parallel to the euro project. It failed primarily because it was a loose intergovernmental strategy based on the »open method of coordination«, in other words wistfulness. While some member-states did become more competitive, others fell behind. The southern economies and Ireland achieved enormous gains in productivity, while Germany’s figures stagnated. Berlin responded with an almost all-party consensus of wage restraint, a neoliberal strategy that substituted foreign import demand for domestic demand. This made Germany »wage competitive« and prevented the productivity gains of the south from materialising in exports, while boosting their imports from Germany. The result was a massive and increasing trade surplus for Germany and an equivalent deficit for the south. German banks then lent back the surplus to the south to further boost the asset price bubble and the consumption boom it created. Once the south collapsed, Germany reluctantly agreed to bail it out, or more precisely the Eurozone, while pushing for state austerity and wage restraint. In essence Berlin was buying time for German banks to decouple from exposure in the south by borrowing cheaply and lending to the south at higher rates through the European Central Bank (ECB). This made Germany look good, increased her leverage and was even profitable, with potential risks spread across ECB contributors. As could be expected, the German remedy failed in the south, as even the IMF is beginning to admit in its own monitoring reports on Greece. Austerity became a vicious circle of falling demand and economic output, necessitating even more austerity in the minds of those obsessed with stabilisation. Wage restraint, preached out of German domestic experience, becomes a logical absurdity as a proselytising faith. If all Eurozone members cut wages, where will exporters find their import demand? Thus the solution for the Eurozone requires a harmonisation of wage policy rather than a transfer of fiscal powers to a Community level of dubious accountability. Fiscal policy is not simply a technical matter, it is deeply
rooted in value judgements, and the failure of the European constitution is proof that the European Commission possesses no clear authority to take over fiscal sovereignty from elected governments.

**Prospects: Legitimacy, Ownership and Efficiency**

Europe needs a constitutional basis that clearly defines its values, and a predominantly federal intergovernmental institutional setup. The fact that the Union does not have a solid common »constitutional« value foundation is evidenced by the recent vote in the European Parliament on the Tavares Report on Democracy in Hungary, where the Socialist, Liberal and Green groups endorsed the critical report, while the European People’s Party supported the Hungarian government. Until such a basis exists, the political left should not be complicit in portraying the existing form of the European Union as »ours«. It should make clear that the existing status quo predominantly favours capital, widening inequalities both within and between member-states, and engendering unsustainability. It must make it clear that present generations still have a struggle on their hands, that their twentieth-century forebears had not taken care of everything required for them to live comfortable lives.

Real federalisation needs willing member-states. Willing member-states presuppose functioning democracies that represent more than economic elites. Unfortunately, the quality of member-state democracies has eroded to a degree where the mainstream parties are more dependent on campaign financing from big business and wealthy individuals than on voters. Citizens are distracted from any potential interest in progressive policies by the mass media, among other things through the vilification of »the other«, especially in the cultural domain. In terms of economic policy the mainstream »cartel« parties have converged on neoliberal policies. Most member states are in essence captured
democracies. Thus the answer to Europe’s problems lies at home, and it starts with banning business entities from campaign financing, as well as effectively limiting individual contributions. The question is whether mainstream left-wing parties would be willing to move back from the liberal centre they have occupied (for which there are signs), or whether anti-establishment parties (the likes of Syriza in Greece) will strengthen to replace them.

Integration without demos? A European demos will come about as a consequence of a primarily federal rather than a predominantly intergovernmental system.
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